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Abstract
The third generation UMTS auction in Germany raised an enor-
mous amount of revenue, and at the same time achieved a more
competitive market structure than other UMTS auctions in Europe.
The present paper explains the design of that auction, and presents
a game theoretic explanation of observed events during the crucial
phase of that auction, which have puzzled several observers. In
addition, the paper evaluates the merit of the German UMTS auc-
tion design, relative to the English design, that was predominantly
employed in Europe.
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1 Introduction
In the year 2000 several European countries auctioned licenses for third
generation (UMTS) mobile telecommunications, the new standard that is
expected to revolutionize mobile communications.1 Among other bene-
fits, UMTS offers enormously higher transmission rates (up to 200 times
faster than the current GSM standard). This allows mobile phone op-
erators to supply an abundance of new services, from virtual banking,
credit card transactions, and information and booking services to fast
inter- and intranet access, audio and video clips on demand, and video
conferencing, that promise to surpass the quality of the most advanced
fixed line telephony.
Building third generation networks and marketing, handling, and billing
the new services is enormously costly. The UMTS technology works at a
higher frequency than GSM (the current industry standard in Europe) to
transmit and receive information; therefore, each base station has amuch
shorter range. Roughly, UMTS networks require 4-16 times as many base
stations to manage a given data flow as the established GSM networks.
More stations also raise health concerns about radio emissions, and ob-
jections against the littering of the environment with transmitters and
radio masts.
Nevertheless, the auctioning of UMTS licenses generated an unsurpassed
amount of revenue. The UK treasury alone earned €37.5 billion, and the
German finance minister cashed in the record sum of €50.8 billion. How-
ever, in some countries the UMTS auctions were disappointing. Revenue
was remarkably low in the Netherlands and in Italy, which has one of the
most profitable mobile phone markets in Europe. And the year ended
with a complete flop in Switzerland, where only four bidders showed up
to bid for four licenses, and the regulator desperately though in vain
tried to patch up last minute changes in auction rules. That anticlimax
continued well into the year 2001, when the auction had to be called off
in Belgium and Israel.
To put the German auction into perspective, Table 1 summarizes the Eu-
ropean UMTS auctions in the year 2000 in chronological order. There, the
first column states the country (a star indicates that the German auction
design was applied; all other countries applied the English rules). The
second column states the month(s) when the UMTS auction took place,
the third the number of bidders, the fourth the number of licenses (when
a range is given, a star indicates the final number of licenses), the fifth
1UMTS means Universal Mobile Telecommunications System; it was introduced by
the International Telecommunications Union as part of the IMT-2000 family of third
generation mobile standards.
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the number of incumbents, the sixth the revenue per population unit, and
the last the revenue divided by the population units per license, which is
a more meaningful performance measure.
Where When # Bidders #Licenses #Incumb €/Pop €/(Pop/Lic)
UK 03/04 13 5 4 630 3.150
Netherlands 07 9/6 5 5 170 850
Germany* 07/08 12/7 4-6* 4 615 3.690
Italy 10 8/6 5 4 210 1.050
Austria* 10 6 4-6* 3 103 618
Switzerland 11/12 10/4 4 3 19 76
Table 1: UMTS Auctions in Europe in the Year 2000
In all third generation (UMTS) spectrum auctions in Europe the supply
of spectrum was roughly the same. A total band of 2× 60 MHz (paired)
spectrum,2 plus some 20 MHz of unpaired spectrum. Also, everybody
employed the same simultaneous, ascending price auction format, which
is well-known ever since the first successful spectrum auctions took place
in the US.
However, there was one important broad difference: Whereas the En-
glish auctioned a fixed number of licenses, each prepackaged with fixed
amounts of radio spectrum (and restricting bidders to bid on one license
only), the German regulator broke down the supply of paired spectrum
into identical blocks, and allowed bidders to aggregate spectrum blocks
into a variable number of licenses, ranging from 4 to 6 licenses. With
the exception of Austria, which followed the German example, all other
European regulators copied the English design.
While the English design earned high praise, the competing German de-
signwas harshly criticized by Jehiel andMoldovanu [2000] andMoldovanu
[2000a,b] as “an error with serious consequences”. Essentially, it was
claimed that, due to their cost advantage, the four incumbents would
outbid all new entrants, and that “the auction would most likely lead
to four licenses in the hands of the four incumbents”. This verdict was
echoed by Klemperer who made similar statements in press interviews.
However, the results of the auction proved these critics wrong. The UMTS
auction in Germany resulted in a more competitive market structure than
in other European countries— altogether 6 licenses were issued, of which
two went to new entrants —, and yet earned the highest revenue.
2Spectrum is paired because one is used to send and the other to receive information.
To see why this is important, just listen to radio communication in a taxi cab; there,
only one party is able to speak, until the line is freed for the other party to respond.
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In Germany seven bidders competed for 12 blocks of paired spectrum
which could be aggregated into either 4 or 5 or 6 licenses. Since a license
had to include at least two blocks, the auction could not possibly end
before one bidder quit the auction. That point was reached in round
126. Here, the auction could have ended, but only if all remaining six
bidders had reduced their demand to two blocks each. However, all six
bidders maintained a demand for three blocks.
As the auction continued, the small incumbents and new entrants re-
duced demand to two blocks, one after another. And so, effective round
147, the two major incumbents (Mannesmann and T-Mobil) found them-
selves at the crucial phase of the auction, where they alone had to decide
whether to end the auction. The predicted four license outcome was
already bygone; the choice was only one between either 5 or 6 licenses.
Both major incumbents chose to maintain a demand for three blocks in
order to acquire a “large” license of 2 × 15 MHz (equal in size to the
large licenses A and B in the UK) each. However, several rounds later
they both aborted that attempt, and the auction ended with 6 “small”
licenses, acquired by the four incumbents and two new entrants.
That outcome, and the preceding behavior during the crucial phase of the
auction, has puzzled several observers. Indeed, Jehiel and Moldovanu
[2001] describe it as “bizarre”, and question whether it can be consistent
with equilibrium. Similarly, Klemperer [2001, footn. 52] equates the
aborted attempt to acquire large licenses and thereby crowd–out one bid-
der with allegedly irrational behavior of his father-in-law (who apparently
tended to quit standing in line, if it moved slowly).
The present paper explains the rules of the German UMTS auction, gives
an account of events, and attempts a rational reconstruction of the play
observed during the crucial phase of the auction. We proceed as fol-
lows: Section 2 explains the auction rules; Section 3 gives a summary of
events, Section 4 introduces key assumptions of our analysis, and Section
5 proposes a game theoretic explanation. Section 6 discusses the merit
of the German auction design, and the paper closes with a summary and
conclusions (Section 7).
2 Auction Rules
Late in the year 1999 the regulator proposed rules for the upcoming
UMTS auction. These were subjected to a hearing process with industry
representatives and subsequently changed. The first proposed rules stip-
ulated some form of discrimination in favor of new entrants. However,
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on February 18, 2000 the regulator decreed an entirely new format that
involves a sequence of two auctions, and excludes all forms of discrimi-
nation. The highlights of these rules are as follows.3
For sale were 2× 60 MHz paired spectrum in the 1900-2025 MHz band.
These were broken up into 12 identical, individual blocks of 2 × 5 MHz
each, numbered 1 to 12. In addition, the regulator offered five blocks of
1 MHz unpaired spectrum also in the 2 GHz range the utility of which
was still somewhat dubious at the time of the auction, which is why we
ignore them here.
The two auctions were simultaneous, open, and ascending. The first
auction was dedicated to sell the paired spectrum and to determine who
gets a license. The second auction was devoted to sell leftover paired
spectrum, in case anything was leftover from the first auction, and to sell
the unpaired spectrum. Participation in the second auctionwas restricted
to those who survived the first auction.
In the first auction bidders were restricted to bid on “at least two” and
“at most three” blocks. Any bidder who, at the end of the first auction,
held either three or two high bids was assured a license, and permitted
to participate in the second auction. Those who held less than two high
bids were excluded from the auction, and relieved from any obligation,
even if they held one high bid.4
In the second auction, the surviving bidders could only bid for at most
one block, in the event anything was leftover from the first auction. Bid-
ding for unpaired spectrum (which will be ignored here) was unrestricted.
Given these restrictions, the feasible number of licenses was between 0
and 6, each endowed with 2 to 4 blocks.5 Ignoring unlikely events, the
relevant outcomes were either 4 or 5 or 6 licenses, endowed with 2 to 3
blocks.
An activity rule stipulated that bidding rights had to be exercised or
would be lost forever. Specifically, the number of bidding rights in round
n+1 was equal to the number of blocks on which that bidder placed a bid
or had already held a high bid in the previous round n. Therefore, once
a bidder had reduced his demand to two blocks, he could never return
to demand three.
In both auctions, only the high bids were made public after every round.
Thus, bidders could not directly observe their rivals’ bids, and did not
3The complete auction rules can be found in RegTP [2000].
4The rationale for the “at least two” restriction was that building a network of ra-
dio stations is not economically feasible with a capacity of only one block of radio
spectrum.
5In order to acquire 4 blocks, a bidder would have to acquire 3 blocks in the first
auction, and one leftover block in the second auction.
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know exactly their number of bidding rights. However, when only a few
high bids change, it is possible to infer bidding rights, as we explain in
Section 3.
The minimum bid was DM 100 million per block, and the minimum in-
crement was 10%. However, the regulator was free to change this, and
he actually reduced it towards the end of the auction. If there were any
leftover spectrum, the minimum bid was reset in the second auction to
DM 100 million per block.
All blocks were “abstract” in the sense that bidders did not buy the right
to obtain concrete spectrum, defined by a particular location within the
2 Ghz band. Instead, the regulator made a pledge to assign the best allo-
cation of spectrum, that minimizes interference, after the results of the
auction are known. In principle, this intelligently eliminated the coordi-
nation problems that plagued earlier spectrum auctions in the US.
We close our account of the auction rules with some straightforward yet
important implications:
1. There cannot be more than six licenses; therefore, the first auction
cannot end before one of the seven bidders has quit.
2. When only six bidders are left, one bidder alone can force out one
other bidder, by maintaining three bidding rights, thus driving up
the prices of all licenses.
3. When only five bidders are left, one more bidder can only be forced
out if at least three bidders maintain three bidding rights.
4. The second auction is potentially appealing, because the minimum
bid for leftover blocks of paired spectrum is set back to DM 100
million, and rival bidders are already “jam-packed”.
3 Summary of Events
The auction was scheduled to begin on July 31, 2000, and it lasted 173
rounds of bidding, until August 17, 2000. Initially 12 bidders registered
to participate. However, one bidder was not approved by the regulator,
and five bidders withdrew successively prior to the auction. As a re-
sult, only seven bidders showed up to bid for 4–6 licenses. These were
the four incumbent mobile phone operators: T-Mobil (a subsidiary of
Deutsche Telekom) (T), Mannesmann–Vodafone (M), e-plus (e+), and Viag
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Interkom (viag), backed by British Telecom, and three new entrants: Mo-
bilcom (mobi), backed by France Telecom, debitel (debi), backed by Swiss-
com, and 3G, backed by Telefonica and Sonera.6
Among the four incumbents, M and T each serve 40% of customers in the
German mobile phone market, whereas e+ and viag have only a market
share of 15% and 5%, respectively. Among the new entrants, debi and
mobi are already present in the market as service providers (with their
own customers and billing system). Only G3 has no prior role in the
market. However, the firms that back G3 were already strong and well-
established European providers of mobile phone services. Also mobi has
a strong backing, whereas debi did not succeed to find strong partners.
At the auction, bidding started cautiously. All bidders opened with the
minimum bid, and then used small increments, except mobi, who started
with a jump bid of DM 501 million on two blocks (see Table 2). It took
45 rounds until the other bidders caught up with that initial jump bid.
Round Frequency Block
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
1
100
T
100
T
100
T
501
mobi
501
mobi
150
M
100
3G
− 100
e+
− − −
2
100
T
100
T
100
T
501
mobi
501
mobi
150
M
100
3G
100
e+
100
e+
100
viag
150
M
150
M
3
110
3G
110
3G
100
T
501
mobi
501
mobi
150
M
111
viag
111
viag
110
debi
100
viag
150
M
150
M
Table 2: Cautious Beginning (high bids per round in DM million)
From the high bids during subsequent rounds, it was clear that initially
all bidders maintained three bidding rights. Thus, in the early rounds of
the auction, total demand was 21 blocks, while supply was only twelve
blocks.
As long as excess demand remains high, bidders cannot typically find
out whether another bidder has reduced demand, since only high (and
not all) bids were published. However, there are circumstances in which
such an inference can be drawn beyond doubt. In particular, one can be
sure that a rival bidder has reduced demand to two blocks if that bidder
• held no high bids in the previous round, and only two high bids
have changed;
6The bidder who was not approved, due to insufficient funding and experience, was
Nets AG; the bidders who withdrew prior to the auction were (in this order): Hutchison
(who formed an alliance with e-plus and thus, had to back out), MCI Worldcom, Vivendi,
and Talkline.
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• held one high bid in the previous round, and only one high bid other
than his own has changed,
• held two high bids in the previous round, and only those bids have
changed.
The first bidder who gave up one bidding right was debi. This was an-
nounced after day nine of the auction (round 115); however, the last
round where debi was seen to have three high bids was round 70. All key
events described in the remainder of this section are illustrated in Table
3.7
The auction could not possibly end before one of the seven bidders quit
the auction. This precondition was met when debi finally gave up, when
price per block had reached roughly DM 5 billion (the announcement
came at the end of day 10 (round 127)).
At this point, all remaining six bidders still maintained three bidding
rights (except possibly viag). Therefore, the full range of market struc-
tures, either 4 of 5 or 6 licenses, was still within reach.
As the auction continued, all bidders, except the two major incumbents,
reduced their demand to two blocks, one after another. Viag was last
seen to have three high bids in round 110, and reduced demand not later
than in round 134.8 3G was seen to be active on three blocks until round
132, and reduced demand to two blocks not later than in round 138.
Both demand reductions were announced after day 11 of the auction
(round 138). On the following day, the auctioneer reduced the minimum
increment from 10% to 5%.
The last round where e+ and mobi had three high bids was 137 and 140,
respectively. In rounds 140 and 146 e+ and mobi followed suit and re-
duced demand as well.
From this point on, it was no longer possible to end the auction with four
licenses (recall: “it takes at least three bidders with three bidding rights
to crowd out two more bidders”). It was also impossible to immediately
terminate the auction with six licenses, since in round 146 M held three
high bids, while mobi only held one.
However, effective round 147, the two major incumbents, M and T, found
themselves at the crucial phase of the auction, where they alone had to
7We have compiled the high bids in all rounds in an excel file, andmake this available
for download at “http://www.wiwi.hu-berlin.de/wt1/papers/umts.zip”. Unfortunately,
the German regulator does not release information on all bids.
8In round 133 viag holds only one high bid, and in rounds 133 and 134 only the high
bid on block 5 changes. Thus, one can infer that viag holds at most two bidding rights
effective round 135.
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Round Frequency Block
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Round 126: debitel exits
125
5117.2
e+
5129.7
e+
4989.0
e+
4897.0
debi
4730.0
viag
4700.0
mobi
4880.0
mobi
4870.0
debi
4872.3
M
4992.1
viag
4947.2
T
4987.3
M
126
5117.2
e+
5129.7
e+
4989.0
e+
5400.0
mobi
5203.0
3G
5200.0
mobi
5368.0
T
5357.0
3G
4872.3
M
4992.1
viag
4947.2
T
4987.3
M
Round 134: viag drops third bidding right
133
6200.0
mobi
6207.0
viag
6060.0
3G
5940.0
M
5723.6
M
6296.6
M
6060.0
3G
5892.7
e+
5895.6
T
6040.6
e+
6060.0
T
6050.0
mobi
134
6200.0
mobi
6207.0
viag
6060.0
3G
5940.0
M
6296.1
e+
6296.6
M
6060.0
3G
5892.7
e+
5895.6
T
6040.6
e+
6060.0
T
6050.0
mobi
Round 138: 3G drops third bidding right; Round 140: e-plus drops third bidding right
137
6200.0
mobi
6207.0
viag
6060.0
3G
6666.0
T
6296.1
e+
6296.6
M
6666.0
T
6482.0
mobi
6485.3
e+
6644.7
viag
6060.0
T
6666.0
M
138
6200.0
mobi
6207.0
viag
6696.0
3G
6666.0
T
6296.1
e+
6296.6
M
6666.0
T
6482.0
mobi
6485.3
e+
6644.7
viag
6696.0
3G
6666.0
M
139
6510.0
T
6517.4
mobi
6696.0
3G
6666.0
T
6296.1
e+
6296.6
M
6666.0
T
6482.0
mobi
6485.3
e+
6644.7
viag
6696.0
3G
6666.0
M
140
6510.0
T
6517.4
mobi
6696.0
3G
6666.0
T
6611.1
e+
6296.6
M
6666.0
T
6482.0
mobi
6485.3
e+
6644.7
viag
6696.0
3G
6666.0
M
Round 146: Mobilcom drops third bidding right
145
6835.5
M
6843.6
M
6696.0
3G
6666.0
T
6941.8
e+
6950.0
mobi
6999.4
viag
7146.6
M
6809.7
e+
6644.7
viag
6696.0
3G
6999.5
T
146
6835.5
M
6843.6
M
6696.0
3G
6999.6
mobi
6941.8
e+
7297.5
T
6999.4
viag
7146.6
M
6809.7
e+
6644.7
viag
6696.0
3G
6999.5
T
147
6835.5
M
6843.6
M
6696.0
3G
6999.6
mobi
6941.8
e+
7297.5
T
6999.4
viag
7146.6
M
6809.7
e+
7001.7
T
6696.0
3G
6999.5
T
Round 167: Telekom drops third bidding right
166
7914.5
viag
7930.0
mobi
7777.7
T
8141.7
M
8036.9
viag
8045.6
M
8141.4
3G
8274.3
e+
7883.7
mobi
8143.9
e+
8143.8
M
8141.4
3G
167
8310.4
viag
7930.0
mobi
8166.6
T
8141.7
M
8036.9
viag
8045.6
M
8141.4
3G
8274.3
e+
8277.9
T
8143.9
e+
8143.8
M
8141.4
3G
Round 173: Final allocation
173
8310.4
viag
8170.0
mobi
8330.0
M
8304.6
3G
8200.0
mobi
8206.6
viag
8304.3
T
8274.3
e+
8277.9
T
8143.9
e+
8143.8
M
8141.4
3G
Table 3: Summary of Demand Reductions (high bids in DM million)
9
decide whether to end the auction or maintain a demand for three blocks,
and thus continue the attempt to crowd out one more bidder from the
auction. They both chose to maintain a demand for three blocks, but
when it turned out that they had not succeeded to crowd out one more
bidder after many more rounds of increasingly costly bidding, T reduced
its demand to two packages in round 167, and M followed suit in round
172.
And so the auction ended in round 173 with six “small” (2 × 10 MHz)
licenses, acquired by the four incumbents, and the two new entrants:
mobi and 3G. The price per block was roughly DM 8 billion, and total
auction revenue DM 98,807.2 million. Since no paired blocks were left
over, in the second auction only unpaired spectrum was sold. There,
each licensee, except viag, got one block, adding DM 561 million to the
auction revenue.
As in other spectrum auctions, bidders occasionally used the last digits
of feasible bids (the smallest money unit was DM 100.000) to signal their
intentions or to attempt a coordination of actions. Such coordination
can be useful to determine who shall get which block if excess demand
has vanished, and, perhaps, to suggest to other bidders that bidding may
come to a quick end if they reduce their demand.
It has been claimed that such signalling occurred already before the cru-
cial phase of the auction, in rounds 133 to 146. Indeed, in these rounds
one observes an abundance of the digit 6, wich we indicate by bold faced
entries in Table 3, and which cannot be explained by the minimum in-
crement requirement. If it is correct to interpret these bids as signals,
one would conclude that bidders M, T, and 3G signalled that they would
be willing to settle with a market structure of 6 licenses. However, one
should probably only consider those bids, if any, where the 6 occurred
in the last digit, because it is hard to believe that bidders would waste
millions and more to convey a signal of dubious value.
An unequivocal case of signalling occurred during and shortly before the
crucial phase of the auction. During the rounds 130 to 150, M sent the
signal “6” in seven out of eight of their visible new (high) bids, indicat-
ing that they would settle with a market structure of 6 licenses. During
rounds 130 to 140, T repeatedly sent the same signal. However, on two
occasions, in rounds 144 and 146 they used a “5” as the last digit of their
high bids (while bidding higher than the required increment). This has
been interpreted to mean that T indicated to M that they do not con-
sent to a market structure of 6 licenses, and instead suggest to continue
the attempt to crowd out another bidder.9 However, this interpretation
9See Jehiel and Moldovanu [2001], who suspect that T may have driven up prices
in the interest of its majority shareholder, the Germany government.
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is not entirely convincing, on several grounds. First of all, T obviously
sent contradictory signals, if their actions were signals at all. Second, M
continued the attempt to crowd out one more bidder even after T had
already reduced its demand to two blocks. And third, it is not clear why
T should convince M to maintain a demand for three blocks, since it did
not require any coordinated effort to crowd out one more bidder, by the
“one is enough to crowd out one bidder” principle.
4 Basic Assumptions
To prepare the game theoretic analysis of the crucial phase of the UMTS
auction in Germany, we now introduce some assumptions and notation.
These are geared to the analysis of the relevant subgames, and they use
some characteristics of the participating bidders, and the Germanmobile
phone market.
Specifically, we assume that bidders have some idea of the ranking of bid-
ders’ valuations, have a preference for a less competitive market struc-
ture, which reflect in valuations that depend on the number of licenses,
and are subject to incomplete information. In addition, we allow for
stochastic dependencies, due to some form of affiliation between valua-
tions.
At the given auction rules, a license is endowed with at least two and
at most four blocks. Therefore, the marginal valuations for two, three,
and four blocksmatter. We denote themarginal valuations of bidder i for
each of the first two blocks by Vi, and those for the third and fourth block
by Vi3, Vi4, respectively. Capital letters Vi, Vij denote random variables,
small letters vi, vij realizations. Marginal valuations are not increasing.
Bidders have some common beliefs about each other’s relative strength.
In particular, the two major incumbents, M and T, are viewed as consid-
erably stronger and as identical. The weaker bidders are ranked by their
strength (in this order) and called bidders 3 to 7. In the industry, one had
a pretty clear understanding of the ranking of their marginal valuations.
Specifically, we assume that for all states in the world
vM = vT >max {v3, . . . , v7} (1)
vM3 = vT3 > v33 ≥ . . . ≥ v73 (2)
vM4 = vT4 (3)
A bidder’s total valuation for 2 and 3 blocks is denoted by wi, wi3 re-
spectively:
wi := 2vi, wi3 := wi + vi3. (4)
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All these valuations v,w are defined for a mobile phone market with six
licenses, which is used as a reference point. Of course, bidders prefer to
operate in a market with fewer competitors. We capture this by assuming
that successful bidders earn higher valuations, represented by a bonus
b > 0, which applies if the number of licenses is reduced from six to
five.10
In order to capture the uncertainty concerning the marginal valuation of
the weakest among six bidders (called bidder 6), which plays a pivotal
role, we assume that V6 has two possible realizations (weak and strong):
V6 ∈ {v6, v′6}, with v′6 > v6, and 0 < Pr{V6 = v6} =: ρ6 < 1.
At some stage in the auction game, the only new information that be-
comes available to the relevant players is the fact that bidder 6 is strong.
Since we allow for stochastically dependent valuations, in this case we as-
sume that bidders update their valuations. We capture this updating by
denoting valuations conditional on V6 = v′6 by primed v′s and w′s. The
valuations that are conditional on V6 = v6 are denoted by the v′s and
w′s without primes. We assume v′ ≥ v , w′ ≥ w, and that the stochastic
ordering (1) is preserved. Expected values of v and w are denoted by
v¯ := v′ −ρ6(v′ −v) and w¯ := w′ −ρ6(w′ −w), respectively. Of course,
our analysis permits, but does not require, stochastically dependent val-
uations.
An important detail of the German UMTS auction, that plays a key role in
understanding events, is the fact that any blocks that are leftover in the
first auction, are auctioned in the second auction. There, the minimum
bid is set back to DM 100 million, only those who bought at least two
blocks in the first auction are permitted to participate, and participants
can only bid on one leftover spectrum. The latter implies that the second
auction has all the essential features of a single-unit auction (see Weber
[1983]), and therefore is easily predictable. In particular, truthful bid-
ding is a (weakly) dominant strategy in that second auction. It follows
immediately that if one player, say T, has acquired three blocks in the
first auction, while all other five licensees have acquired only two blocks,
one block is leftover, and player M will win it in the second auction, and
pay a price equal to
P2 :=max {VT4, V33} . (5)
Of course, if the price in the first auction is already sky–high, it may be
very appealing for player M to make sure that one block is leftover, and
becomes relatively low-cost “prey” in the second auction, whenever that
player has a chance to do so.
10We do not make assumptions concerning a market with four licenses, because this
outcome could not have occurred in the phase of the game that we study here.
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5 Game Theoretic Explanation
We now analyze the crucial phase of the game, from round 148 onward.
At that point only two of the remaining six bidders – the two dominant
incumbents: M and T – have three bidding rights left. The only feasible
market size is either five or six licenses; a four licenses outcome is already
bygone. M and T can now also reduce demand to two blocks, and thus
end the auction with a market size of six licenses, or attempt to crowd-
out one more bidder. Predation succeeds if M or T maintain(s) a demand
for three blocks, until bidder 6 quits the auction, by the “one bidder alone
can force out bidder 6” principle.
As we already pointed out in Section 3, in the actual course of events
during that phase of the auction, both M and T attempted predation.
However, at round 167 T reduced demand to two blocks, M followed
some rounds later, and the auction ended in round 173 with 6 licenses.
The goal of our analysis is to find necessary and sufficient conditions
to explain the observed play as a perfect equilibrium, and to assess the
plausibility of this explanation.
At this phase of the game the only strategic players are M and T. The
other remaining bidders have the weakly dominant strategy to maintain
two bidding rights as long as the price for two blocks is below their val-
uation. Also, only the valuation of the weakest of the remaining bidders
(which is bidder 6) is relevant for the strategic decisions of M and T.
Therefore, we can view this situation as a game played between the two
strong bidders, M and T, taking the behavior of bidders 3 to 6 as given,
yet facing significant uncertainty about the valuation of the weakest re-
maining bidder.
In the following, we slightly simplify the remaining first auction game
by condensing it to a two stage game. In the first stage, bidders M and
T simultaneously choose either the action “r(esign)” (reduce demand to
two blocks, immediately) or the action “t(ry predation)” by bidding prices
up to the level v6. The auction ends immediately, at the current price p,
if both M and T play r . If M or T plays t, prices go up to the level v6.
At this point bidder 6 quits and the auction ends with a market size
of 5 licenses in the event when bidder 6 is weak (V6 = v6). Whereas
if bidder 6 is strong (V6 = v′6), the game enters into the second stage.
At this stage, valuations are common knowledge because it is clear by
exclusion that bidder 6 is strong. Bidders who played “t” now have the
choice between the actions “pr(edation)” (drive up prices further to the
level v′6) and “r(esign)” (reduce demand to two blocks immediately). If M
or T plays pr , prices go up to the level v′6, at which point bidder 6 quits,
and a market size of five licenses is reached.
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When predation has succeeded, but either M or T has reduced demand to
two blocks, one block is leftover.11 That leftover block is then sold in the
second auction, and, given our assumptions, it will be acquired by the
one dominant bidder who had reduced demand in the first auction, at
the expected price p2 := E[max{V14, V33}|V6 = v6], if bidder 6 is weak,
and p′2 := E[max{V ′14, V ′33}|V6 = v′6] if bidder 6 is strong, respectively.
The game tree of the first auction is depicted in Figure 1.
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Figure 1: Game tree of the crucial phase of the UMTS auction
A strategy for a player is given by three actions at the three information
sets in which the player has tomove. So, the strategy (t, r ,pr) of player M
means that he maintains three bidding rights in the first stage, reduces
demand in stage 2 if the other player has reduced demand in stage 1,
and maintains three bidding rights in stage 2 if the other player has also
maintained three bidding rights in stage 1.
The payoffs are as follows. If bothM and T play r in stage 1, their payoff
is w¯12−2p, where p denotes the current price, at the beginning of stage
114× 2 plus 1× 2 makes 11 blocks; since 12 blocks are available, one is left over.
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1. If one bidder has played t and bidder 6 is weak, then bidder 6 quits,
and prices are equal to v6. The bidder who played t earns the payoff
w13 + b − 3v6, and the bidder who played r gets two blocks in the first
auction and a third block in the second auction, at the expected price p2;
his payoff is thus w13 + b − 2v6 − p2.
If at least one bidder plays t and bidder 6 happens to be strong, the game
continues. If one bidder has reduced demand, the other bidder has the
option to crowd-out bidder 6 by increasing prices up to v′6 or to give up.
If he gives up, both bidders obtain w′12 − 2v6. Otherwise, he gets w′13 +
b−3v′6, whereas the other bidder obtains the payoffw′13+b−2v′6−p′2. If
both bidders have maintained three bidding rights, we are in a subgame
with complete information in which both players can choose two actions.
The payoffs of bidder M are summarized in table 4, where ∆2pr denotes
the gain from unilateral predation, and ∆2fr the gain from “free riding”
(playing r while the rival plays pr).
We begin the analysis with the stage 2 subgames which are reached if at
least one bidder has tried predation, but player 6 has not quit, because
he happens to be strong. When these subgames are played, prices are
already at the levelv6, and it is common knowledge that bidder 6 is strong
(V6 = v′6). Since the valuations of bidders 3 to 5 do not matter, it follows
that these games can be viewed as games of complete information.
Lemma 1 Consider all stage 2 subgames. Demand reduction is an equilib-
rium of these subgames iff “unilateral predation” does not pay:
∆2pr := v′13 + b −
(
3v′6 − 2v6
) ≤ 0 (6)
That equilibrium is unique iff the inequality (6) is strict and, in addition,
“free riding” pays:
∆2fr := v′6 − p′2 > 0. (7)
Proof In a first step consider the particular stage 2 subgame in which
both M and T have three bidding rights. Its payoff matrix is given in
Table 4. From this one can see immediately that (r , r) is an equilibrium
iff unilateral predation (playing pr while the rival plays r ) does not pay,
i.e. iff ∆2pr ≤ 0. If the latter inequality is strict, (r ,pr) cannot also be
an equilibrium. This leaves only (pr,pr) as another candidate for an
equilibrium. However, if the rival plays pr, playing r entails that one
block is leftover and acquired in the second auction at the expected price
p2. Evidently, such “free riding” on predation pays iff a third block is
cheaper in the second than in the first auction, i.e. iff ∆2fr > 0.
Now, consider those stage 2 subgames in which only one of the two play-
ers has three bidding rights. Evidently, if ∆2pr ≤ 0, it is optimal for that
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Bidder 2 (T)
r pr
r
(
w′12 − 2v6
)
[. . . ]+∆2fr
Bidder 1 (M)
pr (. . . )+∆2pr
[
w′13 + b − 3v′6
]
Table 4: Payoff Matrix of Stage 2 Subgame
bidder to also reduce demand. If that inequality is strict, this is the
unique optimal decision.
Note, if these conditions for uniqueness of equilibrium are satisfied, r is
actually a dominant strategy in all stage 2 subgames. 
Using these results we arrive at the following necessary and sufficient
conditions for existence and uniqueness of a subgame perfect equilib-
rium that conforms with the observed pattern of behavior.
Theorem 1 The strategies (t, r , r) for both players are a subgame perfect
equilibrium iff free riding does not pay in stage 1:
∆1fr := ρ6
(
v6 − p2
) ≤ 0 (8)
and ∆2pr ≤ 0 (unilateral predation does not pay in the stage 2 subgame).
That subgame perfect equilibrium is unique iff the inequality concerning
∆1fr is strict, unilaterally trying predation pays:
∆1t := ρ6 (v13 + b − v6)− 2(v6 − p) > 0, (9)
and ∆2pr < 0,∆
2
fr > 0 (r is a dominant strategy in all stage 2 subgames).
Proof The payoff matrix for bidder M of the reduced game in stage 1 is
given in Table 5, assuming that r is played in all stage 2 subgames by both
M and T. There, the gain from free riding on predation (playing r while the
rival plays t) is ∆1fr = ρ6(v6 − p2) because one gets a third block, at the
expected price p2, in the second auction only in the event when bidder 6
is weak. Similarly, the gain from unilaterally trying predation (playing t
while the rival plays r in stage 1) is ∆1t = ρ6 (v13 + b − v6)− 2(v6 − p) ,
because one obtains a third block at the higher price v6 when the sixth
bidder is weak, and incurs the cost of raising prices to the level v6, with
no benefit, in the event when bidder 6 is strong.
By Lemma 1 it is known that r is an equilibrium strategy in stage 2 if
∆2pr ≤ 0. Therefore, Table 5 applies, and it follows immediately that
(t, r , r) is an equilibrium iff ∆1fr ≤ 0 and ∆2pr ≤ 0.
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Bidder 2 (T)
r t
r (w¯12 − 2p) [. . . ]+∆1fr
Bidder 1 (M)
t (. . . ) + ∆1t [w¯12 − 2v6 + ρ6(v13 + b − v6)]
Table 5: Reduced Form Payoff Matrix of Stage 1 Subgame
The stronger conditions assure uniqueness of equilibrium in all stage 2
subgames, and uniqueness of equilibrium in the stage 1 reduced form
game represented by Table 5. 
Is this rational “reconstruction” of the observed events in the German
UMTS auction plausible?
A first objection might be that bidders do not engage in such compli-
cated strategic reasoning as required in the above model. After all, why
should they not bid in a straightforward way up to their valuation as in an
ascending single unit auction? Now, one must note that such straightfor-
ward bidding is an ambiguous thing in the present multi–unit framework
because the valuation of the bidders depends on the final number of li-
censes. So, keeping three bidding rights up to v13 + b, e.g., can easily
lead to a winner’s curse problem in case the attempted predation is not
successful. On the other hand, keeping three bidding rights just up to
v13 is also not convincing because one does get the bonus if one gets
three blocks. So, already the definition of straightforward bidding leads
to ’complicated’ reasoning.
Moreover, there is by now ample theoretical evidence that straightfor-
ward bidding need not be an equilibrium in multi–unit auctions because
bidders have an incentive to strategically reduce demand in order to keep
prices low.12 In any case, straightforward bidding is not a weakly domi-
nant strategy, which it is in the single unit case.
Finally, M and T have already shown during the German GSM auction in
1999 that they understand very well the strategic issues of such auctions.
There, M first outbid the two weaker bidders, and then equally shared the
10 blocks with T, without further driving up prices (see our account of
these events in Grimm et al. [2001], where we also show that this play
is the unique perfect equilibrium of that game).
Summing up, there is strong evidence that M and T did not use straight-
forward bidding.
12See Ausubel and Schwartz [1999], Menezes [1996], Grimm, Riedel, and Wolf-
stetter [2001], Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Kahn [1998].
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Given that M and T behaved strategically, one may ask whether the con-
ditions which are necessary to explain the observed behavior are plau-
sible. When M and T give up the attempted predation, the (conditional
expected) valuation of the sixth bidder must be relatively high compared
to the bonus from predation and the additional value of a third block.
This seems plausible since prices had already reached a high level when
M and T gave up.
Ex ante, it must have been worth trying predation for M and T. A neces-
sary condition for this is that there was no incentive for free riding, that
is, no incentive to reduce bidding rights to two and let the other player
attempt predation. This means that the expected price p2 of a block in
the second round is higher than the valuation of a weak bidder 6. Now,
under which conditions is p2 high? Since it is determined by the maxi-
mum of V14 and V33, either the valuation for a fourth block must be high
forM and T , or the valuation for a third block must be high for the third
bidder. Now, V14 might be high when the value of being the unique leader
with double capacity compared to the opponents is considered as high.
V33 is high, when the third bidder is willing to pay a lot for reaching the
capacity of the two leading firms. Both cases are, of course, plausible.
One may object that V33 must have been low because the third bidder
had already reduced his bidding rights. However, as we argued above,
straightforward bidding is generally not optimal behavior for the third
bidder either. Therefore, it is quite plausible that the third bidder had
an incentive to reduce demand before prices reached the level of his
marginal valuation. This is in particular the case when the third bidder
thinks that a market size of four cannot be reached.
6 Merit of the German Auction Design
Should future spectrum auction designers borrow some key ingredients
of the design employed in the German UMTS auction?13
While one may debate whether the German regulator should have as-
sured at least one new entry into the mobile phone market, the idea of
allowing some flexibility by letting bidders aggregate their own licenses,
is appealing. Indeed, starting from the English style rules, which broke
down the available 60 MHz of paired spectrum into 5 fixed licenses in
13For a detailed discussion of the deficiencies of the English auction design, and a
number of further recommendation for changing spectrum auction rules, see Wolf-
stetter [2001]. For a very careful critical assessment of the English auction design,
and some puzzling features of actual bidding in the English auction, see Börgers and
Dustmann [2001].
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the UK, it might have been better to break down the available supply into
individual blocks, and allow bidders to aggregate these blocks into either
5 or 6 licenses. By thus borrowing from the German auction rules, the
British would have assured at least five licenses, and yet reached more
competition or more revenue.
A defendant of the English rules might respond that revenue cannot be
lower if one excludes that flexibility and sticks to the English rules. For, if
the German style rules lead to 6 licenses, revenue must be lower (bidders
prefer a market of 5 licenses to one of 6), whereas if it results in only 5
licenses, revenue should be just the same as in the English design. There-
fore, one is lead to conclude that allowing bidders to aggregate spectrum
into either 5 or 6 licenses, in the spirit of the German design, may give
rise to more competition but never to more revenue (and certainly never
more competition and more revenue).
However, this argument misses one important point: It assumes that
bidder participation is the same under both rules, and that there are
more bidders than licenses. Once bidders know the ranking of their val-
uations, which they did after the battle for the pan-European field was
settled, low ranking bidders know that they will always be outbid in an
open ascending auction, and therefore do not even bother to participate.
This suggests that the English design poses a serious bidder participation
problem: as a tendency, the number of participating bidders converges
to the number of licenses, as it did occur in Switzerland (see Table 1), and
thereafter in Belgium and in Israel (where the auction was subsequently
called off).
Competition is not a free good; in order to participate, bidders must have
some reasonable chance of obtaining a license. The flexibility offered
by the German style auction design does offer such an incentive. If it is
effective and raises bidder participation, the German style auction design
may, paradoxically, give rise to more competition and more revenue.
The two last UMTS auctions in the year 2000, in Austria and Switzerland,
are a case in point. Austria employed the German and Switzerland the En-
glish design. The enthusiasm of the market concerning the prospects of
the UMTS technology had already cooled off, and the main battles for the
pan-European field were already settled. Nevertheless, the performance
was quite different. After the usual “bidder meltdown”, in Austria 6 bid-
ders showed up to bid for 4–6 licenses; whereas in Switzerland 4 bidders
showed up to bid for 4 licenses; exactly as one would expect it to occur,
after bidders know their ranking of valuations. In the end, both auctions
earned relatively low revenues, however, Austria achieved considerably
more competition (3 vs. 1 new entries), and more revenue (see Table 1).
Another interesting feature of the German auction was the sale of “ab-
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stract” spectrum, already mentioned in Section 2. In principle, this may
eliminate the coordination problems that plagued earlier spectrum auc-
tions in the US. However, while this worked well in the 1999 German GSM
auction, it was apparently not as successful in the German UMTS auction.
Indeed, one year after the auction, the regulator and license holders have
not yet reached an agreement on the allocation of concrete spectrum.
However, in one regard, the German design was unnecessarily compli-
cated. Instead of asking for bids on the numbered abstract licenses, it
would have been better to employ an “ascending price clock auction”
format. There, the auctioneer announces a uniform price per block, and
asks bidders to state their demand at that unit price. If demand is equal
to or below the given supply, the auction ends, and bidders get what they
demanded at that price; whereas if demand exceeds supply, the unit price
is raised by one increment, and the procedure is repeated. This format
would have eliminated bidder coordination problems. Moreover, there
would have been no need for the “at least two” restriction, because in
that auction format no bidder is ever left with just one spectrum block,
unless he finds it profitable to operate with one block.
7 Conclusions
In the present paper we explained the rules of the German UMTS auction,
and proposed a rational reconstruction of the observed play. Our results
suggest that the outcome of that auction is not at all bizarre, contrary
to what some of the critics of the German auction design have claimed.
Moreover, we could not confirm the critics’ other contention, that the
auction design used in Germany is inferior to that used in England and
in most other European countries. On the contrary, we pointed out that
the design used in Germany tends to give rise to more competition or
more revenue than the competing English design, which indeed it did in
the European spectrum auctions in the year 2000. This suggests that the
designers of future spectrum auctions may be well advised to borrow
some ingredients of that design.
At the same time, we would like to stress that the design of good spec-
trum auction mechanisms is still subject to many open questions. Nei-
ther the English nor the German design is geared to achieve efficiency in
the sense of maximizing the weighted sum of consumer and producer
surplus; our understanding of multi–unit auctions is still insufficient;
and the design of optimal mechanisms that implement an efficient mar-
ket structure is still in its infancy.14 Moreover, bidder participation will
remain a concern, even if one alleviates it by introducing the kind of
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flexibility in the aggregation of licenses that was used in Germany. In
this regard, a major improvement can only be expected if one replaces
the auctioning of the portions of the radio spectrum set aside for mo-
bile telecommunication by auctioning the entire radio spectrum in one
auction.
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